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Axel Honneth and Jacques Rancière represent two different, but complementary post-
Marxist traditions in political thought. Honneth, third generation Frankfurt school 
theorist and student of Jürgen Habermas, has developed a social theory of recognition 
in response to injustice. Working across the social sciences, Honneth draws on 
sociology, moral philosophy and legal studies to construct a critical normative theory 
that can establish the social conditions for freedom and combat the injustice of late 
modern capitalism. 
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Although Rancière is also an inheritor of the broad Frankfurt School critical 
theory tradition, his roots lie most firmly in the Parisian poststructuralism of the late 
1960s. A student of Althusser, he famously broke with scientific Marxism to 
denounce Althusser’s epistemological break, and indeed any division of knowledge, 
as inimical to emancipation. Following this turn, Rancière’s theoretical concerns stem 
from his archival work which sought to articulate the play of logic that underlies any 
moment of revolt or societal change. Arguing that equality is the lynchpin of 
emancipation, he has written widely on a range of topics stemming from film and 
media to literature and philosophy. Recently Rancière has identified ‘misadventures’ 
in the Frankfurt school critical theory project (2009). With this in mind, his broad 
interdisciplinary approach could be seen to retrace the terrain covered by Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s first generation Frankfurt school project, salvaging the commitment to 
emancipation whilst scuppering the last vestiges of the division of knowledge. 
This encounter between Honneth and Rancière is therefore particularly 
opportune. It represents not simply an engagement between two thinkers, but a chance 
to better appreciate the legacy of the Frankfurt school’s emancipatory project whilst 
plotting a course for critical theory’s future travails. 
Despite its usual translation into English as disagreement, Rancière famously 
distinguishes mesentente as a particular type of disagreement: ‘the distortion at the 
heart of any mutual dialogue’ (Recognition or Disagreement, 83). The editors of 
Recognition or Disagreement claim repeatedly that such a disagreement is staged by 
the dialogue between Jacques Rancière and Axel Honneth that comprises the core of 
this book. Yet this assessment comes a little too readily to hand. More is going on in 
the text than we can communicate by glossing it as ‘mesentente’. Indeed, it might 
seem that there is also an amount of what Rancière would term simple 
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‘misunderstanding’, ‘mislistening’, ‘misreading’ and even a missed opportunity that 
are overlooked in the hasty acceptance that this is ‘mesentente’ at play. Ironically, this 
series of near misses produces something invaluable, not only to students and scholars 
of Rancière, Honneth, or even poststructuralism and deliberative theory more widely, 
but to all with an interest in political philosophy. 
According to Rancière (1999, p. xi), disagreement (mesentente) refers to a 
situation in which ‘the interlocutors both understand and do not understand the same 
thing by the same words’. It is distinguished from misunderstanding in that the latter 
is simply a question of knowledge which ‘can be resolved by a simple explanation of 
what the other’s sentence is saying – unbeknownst to the other’ (ibid). Furthermore, 
‘[d]isagreement occurs wherever there is contention over what speaking means’ 
(ibid.). Although disagreement and misunderstanding are not mutually exclusive 
categories, the majority of the dialogue between Honneth and Rancière demonstrates 
more misunderstanding than disagreement. Neither disputes what speaking means so 
much as they clarify and remedy the lack of knowledge of each other’s’ work. As too 
often happens with scholars working in what should be complementary traditions, 
there is little everyday motivation or even opportunity to work together, enhanced 
perhaps in this case by the historical separation between French poststructuralists and 
German critical theorists. In providing an opportunity for dialogue this book forces us 
to address the issues that are at stake. Of course, Rancière and Honneth do at times 
demonstrate disagreement over what they mean by the words they use (115), but in 
most cases where this does occur, they work through it, bringing their respective 
projects closer together. This is important. By referring to the entire encounter with 
the blanket term ‘mesentente’, we fail to identify and investigate where the dialogue 
in actual fact demonstrates misunderstanding, or indeed out and out conflict which is 
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to be argued over and resolved. Reflection on the differences between mesentente, 
misunderstanding and conflict, enables us to assess the import of this book for 
political theory and to see what is at stake for emancipatory politics. 
Although Recognition or Disagreement emerged from a short exchange 
between Rancière and Honneth in Frankfurt in 2009, it is the work of the editors that 
contributes the most novelty. Katia Genel’s opening chapter provides a fantastic 
introduction to the two thinkers, mapping their position carefully within a wider 
reconstruction of the critical theory tradition. Jean-Phillipe Deranty’s essay then 
analyses the convergence and divergence of these thinkers, summarising and 
critiquing the encounter, while highlighting the underlying unresolved debate at its 
core between normative and anti-normative theory. 
However, neither Genel nor Deranty identify the cause of all the ‘missing’ that 
takes place in the subsequent dialogue. This is brought into focus by Honneth’s 
penultimate comment in his dialogue with Rancière. He states that his work aims ‘to 
explain why specific groups do dissent or do start to rebel’ (128). His is a theoretical 
project about ‘what is really going on’ (128) aiming to bring about conditions for self-
realisation (23). In contrast, Rancière famously insists that he is not doing theory. He 
does not seek to ‘explain’ anything, least of all to claim he could know what is really 
going on (see The Method of Equality, 95), instead observing and describing what he 
has seen, weaving narratives, he polemically challenges his readers to reinvent 
politics, for the rest ‘is up to them’ (The Method of Equality 91). Yet, in The Method 
of Equality, he emphasises that there are two kinds of work that contribute to politics: 
 
there is an attempt to shatter – as much at the level of the conceptual, 
supposedly theoretical, analysis as at the level of ticking off current police 
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watchwords – common notions that are most often shared by upholders of a 
certain order and those who think they are contesting that order. But these 
interventions are deployed against a certain backdrop, which is the work that 
constructs the sensible fabric and allows us to think that the people who are 
talking about emancipation are reasonable and that they are proposing 
desirable things. (156) 
 
Although the first – the ‘shattering’ which is also referred to as ‘breaking and 
entering’ (e.g., 72) – is Rancière’s speciality, the second, is much closer to the work 
that Honneth proposes. Indeed, there is something of a chicken and egg problem here. 
Recall that, for Rancière, politics is a staging that scrambles as much as it can the 
existing conceptual field. It could therefore be argued that where recognition is most 
difficult we will first need politics to help bring it about; yet conversely, we may 
worry that to enable politics to be effective (rather than suppressed) we first need 
conditions for recognition to provide a receptive terrain for politics.1 In this sense we 
could suggest that the task of critical theory is to engage both Rancière and Honneth’s 
projects in tandem in the service of emancipation.  
Recognition or Disagreement interestingly effects less recognition and 
disagreement between the thinkers, so much as it stages a conflict, cordial and 
mutually informative, but urgent all the same, about the future of critical theory and 
its emancipatory aims. It stages little breaking of thought, and instead sees the 
interlocutors remaining in their trenches, although perhaps a little closer than they 
once were. Yet it is this that makes the text worth reading. Genel and Deranty 
summarise and situate Rancière and Honneth’s work while the philosophers critique 
each other’s theories and clarify their own positions. This is accompanied by a 
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thorough bibliography of primary and secondary texts. The book thereby serves to 
precisely locate and explore the points of convergence and the sharp contrasts that 
remain between the thinkers, whilst also acting as an excellent gateway to further 
research. 
The exceptionally long interview published as The Method of Equality marks a 
departure for Rancière. Although he has given many interviews, this is the only one to 
clarify and document his work on this scale. It appears to explain his ideas and 
motivations in a manner that he had, up until now, assiduously avoided. Nonetheless 
he still seeks to eschew the status many might ascribe to him, asserting that all a 
master does is merely to provoke (49); and despite the interviewer’s early probing 
questions, his life, family, and upbringing, remain in the shadows, illuminated in brief 
moments and then hidden again. He stridently disavows his status and role as 
anything other than a researcher and writer. He is not a sociologist, philosopher, 
theorist, or historian; nor did he set out with a method (25, 33, 36, 47). He has many 
influences and interests, seeing no reason to be restrained by disciplinary boundaries. 
He draws widely on the classics, literature, art, philosophy, music, film, and even at 
times a kind of critical mathematics, yet in a way that shows how interdisciplinarity 
need not be contrived. It is the simple art of refusing artificial partitions of 
knowledge. 
The interview comprises four parts: geneses, lines, thresholds and present 
tenses. This format jars somewhat with Rancière’s own writing, which never follows 
a chronological path. Rather than seeking to mirror or substitute for his written work, 
the interview is better seen as an accompaniment to his writing. As a voice over, it 
traces the links, the developments, and clarifies argument in places correcting 
misunderstandings or infelicitous wording of earlier texts (e.g., 70, 134). It could 
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never replace the experience of reading Rancière’s writings for it has none of his 
usual narrative form, poetry, stagings, fables and characters. There are no surprises, 
twists or turns. His writing usually avoids explanation of the sort provided here, 
assuming an audience of equal intelligence (86). The drawback is that readers 
sometimes discover that equal prior knowledge, or equal understanding of the history 
of French literature or indeed the nuances of Ancient Greek cannot be presumed. The 
interview thus functions as a guidebook for readers. It may help them to begin their 
foray into Rancière’s work whilst never fully preparing them for the unique 
discoveries and chance encounters that come to define any journey. 
Reading these texts together juxtaposes the way that Rancière’s writing moves 
between space and time (The Method of Equality, 57-61) with Honneth’s respect for 
the space and time of our world. Honneth works with the possible, Rancière pushes to 
challenge the possible world with that which, up until now had been considered 
impossible (The Method of Equality, 147-8). His scant regard for proper boundaries 
problematises obedience to laws, including those of science, time, and history.2 His 
commitment to humour and provocation (The Method of Equality, 91) are profoundly 
political tools,3 enabling him to emerge from this interview as the joker to Honneth’s 
tragedian. He laughs not at suffering, but in the face of adversity. Honneth is 
reverential, Rancière an irreverent reminder that democrats have a duty to play at the 
boundaries of the possible, and toy with the impossible to reveal its latent possibility. 
The emergence of both of these books in the same year draws attention to 
Rancière’s project and indicates that publishers are identifying a need for explanatory 
texts that seek to both introduce and situate Rancière’s work within the philosophical 
discipline more broadly. Indeed, the often puzzled reception of Rancière’s work no 
doubt does arise from a lack of understanding, yet is undoubtedly exacerbated by his 
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challenging strategy of doubling that exploits mesentente to problematise how we 
think and live. His method breaks the binaries that the study of politics is expected to 
maintain, and refuses the rigid policing of our disciplines. He undermines the 
distinctions we take for granted: art/science, poetry/philosophy, equality/freedom, 
normativity/anti-normativity and relativism/universalism, showing that it is only by 
doing differently that we make the impossible possible. 
Rancière emphasises to Honneth that politics is not an exceptional moment 
(Recognition or Disagreement, 129), but when two worlds hang in the balance. 
Honneth works in the world, Rancière remains steadfastly on its margins. It is left to 
us readers to figure out how we can benefit from the wealth of both these traditions in 
the struggle against injustice and inequality. Following the example set by the 
encounter between Rancière and Honneth we must work to remedy misunderstanding 
and confront areas of conflict between these traditions. If we continue to write off 
these encounters as mesentente we may too easily allow critical theory to miss its 
mark.  
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Notes 
1 For further discussion of this problem, see Woodford (2015) and (2016, particularly 
pp. 11-13). 
2 I do not agree with Deranty’s assessment that Rancière historicises aesthetics, but 
not politics. Instead, I read Rancière as always between the two: historicist inasmuch 
as he is aware that context provides particular conditions for the particular modes of 
staging, but never limiting staging to any specific historical era.  
3 Woodford (2016, chapter 5). 
                                                        
